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Abstract 
This concluding piece on the ethics of 
development-induced displacement 
notes how all of the preceding articles 
find the displacement of people by devel- 
opment policies and projects morally 
objectionable and that it should be pre- 
vented. The question of why it is mor- 
ally objectionable, how states attempt to 
justify it nevertheless, and how accept- 
able such justifications are, is addressed 
in some detail. This is a discussion that 
falls into the terrain ofthe newfield of 
development ethics. Development's 
promise to reduce pmerty and inequal- 
ity have been used to justify large 
projects and disruptive policies. In as- 
sessing these justifications, three lines 
of ethical argument are explored, one in 
terms of the public interest, a second in 
terms of self-determination, and third 
in terms of distributive justice. The con- 
clusion is that, while forced migration 
cannot be categorically declared unjus- 
tifiable, the conditions that must be met 
for its justifiability are considerable. 
Ce texte conclusif sur l'e'thique du dk- 
placement de populations du au dhe- 
loppement fait d'abord observer 
combien toutes les contributions du pri- 
sent n u w o  consid&ent que le diplace- 
ment de populations cause' par des 
politiques de dheloppement est morale- 
ment condamnableet sedoit d'ttrehite'. 
La question du pourquoi de ce caract2re 
moralement condamnable, la descrip- 
tion des tentatives des gouvernements 
pour le justijk malgre' tout, et la ques- 
tion du degrt d'acceptabilite' de telles . 
justifications sont abor&s ici en de'tails. 
La prksente discussion s'inscrit dans le 
domaine nouveau de l'gthique du D h -  
loppement. La promesse que fait le dhe- 
Peter Penz is Associate Professor, Faculty of 
Environmental Studies, York University, 
Toronto. 
loppement de re'duire la pauvrete' et les 
inigalitks a e'te' utilise'e pour le'gitimer 
des projets pharaoniques et des politi- 
ques de'stabilisatrices. En h luant  de 
telles proce'dures de justification, on 
exploite ici trois types d'arguments 
Cthiques. Le premier se formule en ter- 
mes d'inte'rtt public, le second en termes 
d'auto-de'termination, le troisihe en 
termes de justice distributive. La con- 
clusion est que la migration force'e ne 
peut ttre de'clarbe injustifiable de facon 
absolument catkgorique, mais que les 
conditions devan t &re rencontre'es pour 
que sa le'gitimite' se fasse jour son t d'une 
complexite' considhable. 
Displacement and Development 
Ethics 
The implication of the preceding arti- 
cles is that the displacement of people 
by development policies and projects 
is morally objectionable and that it 
should be prevented. In this short arti- 
cle I will address the question of why it 
is morally objectionable, how states 
attempt to justdy it nevertheless, and 
how acceptable such justifications are. 
It falls into the terrain of the new field 
of development ethics.' 
But first a prior question: why en- 
gage in complex ethical analysis of an 
issue such as development-induced 
displacement in the first place? This 
question arises from two diametrically 
opposed orientations. One argues that 
economic advancement has always 
meant that the landscape of produc- 
tion and distribution is changed and 
people are often forced to move as a 
result. It is claimed that people need to 
learn to adjust (and, perhaps, that they 
be helped to adjust). Displacement has 
been ubiquitous in industrial develop- 
ment, whether capitalist or socialist. In 
fact, it reflects mobility and as such is 
the opposite to immobility, being 
trapped in a particular place. Mobility 
is desirable, immobility is not. The 
former indicates freedom, the latter its 
lack. In any case, as long as devel- 
opment serves the public interest, 
there is no larger ethical issue in- 
volved. This position represents a form 
of developmentalism that is morally 
simplistic in that it treats only the ends 
of development as involving moral 
judgments, but not the means. It will 
be addressed further under the public- 
interest argument below. The other 
orientation that would short-circuit an 
ethical analysis is the opposite to the 
first. It is no less simplistic morally. 
According to this perspective, dis- 
placement is ethically unacceptable, 
pure and simple, and so are any de- 
velopment projects and policies that 
lead to it. But this line of argument 
second ignores the justifications that 
can and have been offered for de- 
velopment-induced displacement. 
Simplistic moralism, whether pro- or 
anti-development, is objectionable. 
Both the means of development and 
their justifications require ethical scru- 
tiny. 
Displacement as Evil 
The initial moral sigruficance of dis- 
placement resides in its very defini- 
tion. To displace people means to force 
them to leave their home, village, 
town, region or country. To the extent 
that coercion is morally objectionable, 
displacement is too. Moreover, dis- 
placing people usually involves harm- 
ing them. They lose their land, their 
livelihoods, their social networks and 
the cultural patterns contained in 
than, the environment for which they 
have accumulated experience and 
knowledge and to which they are at- 
tached, to mention just the most basic 
losses. Thus, apart from the moral ob- 
jection to coercion, there is the further 
objection to harming people in ways 
other than contravening their wishes 
and commitments. Whether various 
kinds of compensation (including as- 
sistance with becoming reestablished 
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in a suitable alternative location) can 
offset the harm then becomes a crucial 
question. 
Migration forced by development 
places responsibility on the shoulders 
of those taking the development initia- 
tives. If development is an unguided 
process, one driven by a national or 
global system that is beyond the con- 
trol of any identifiable human agency, 
then of course there is no such respon- 
sibility. However, choices with respect 
to development are made. The 
economy is not an impersonal ma- 
chine. While there may be structural 
constraints on decision-makers, they 
still have choices such as whether to 
protect the land rights of forest-dwell- 
ers in the face of logging interests or 
whether to support a system of many 
small dams that have limited displace- 
ment as opposed to one of a few big 
darns with extensive displacement 
Given that there is moral respohsi- 
bility for development decisions with 
displacement effects, this in itself does 
not mean that development choices 
that dislocate people are necessarily 
immoral. Even if it is recognized that 
displacement is bad because it in- 
volves harm or coercion, it is possible 
that it is a justifiable evil when consid- 
ered within the larger picture. In par- 
ticular, the question arises of whether 
the good that development does can 
morally outweigh its bad conse- 
quences, including uprooting people. 
My brief exploration of this question 
will involve three stages. I will con- 
sider, in turn, arguments in terms of 
the public interest, liberty, property 
rights, and community autonomy, and 
equal  har ring.^ My conclusion will be 
that, while not all displacement due to 
development can be ruled out as mor- 
ally unjustifiable, such justification 
and the social provisions that satisfy it 
have to go beyond the public interest 
and compensation for losses. 
The Public Interest 
Much economic development is justi- 
fied in terms of the public interest. 
From this public-interest perspective, 
as long as the overall well-being of 
people is increased, even development 
projects that have the unfortunate ef- 
fect of uprooting some people should 
be pursued (unless there are altema- 
tive projects that would provide even 
higher net benefits, in which case these 
shouldbe adopted instead). This moral 
stance is in fact operationalized in cost- 
benefit analysis, which is the standard 
method of evaluating development 
projects. To be satisfactory on its own 
terms, this approach must include dis- 
placement effects as costs. These in- 
clude the loss of land, homes, fields, 
and transportation and other infra- 
structure that may be involved, the 
disruption of livelihoods and commu- 
nities, theseparation from culturally 
significant places, and the cost for 
people to reestablish themselves else- 
where. Cost-benefit analysis is sup- 
posed to convert all this into a single 
dimension of commensurability, spe- 
cifically money. Theoretically, this 
is to be done by people's individual 
valuation in money terms. Thus the 
losses involved in leaving a commu- 
nity are to be evaluated by determin- 
ing what individuals would need in 
terms of compensation in order to ac- 
cept leaving the community. Of 
course, implicit in this assessment are 
the alternatives available to them. The 
thrust of this approach is that all costs 
and benefits are to be taken into ac- 
count in determining the overall net 
benefits of a project or policy. It will be 
in the public interest if it generates net 
benefits and if there is no alternative 
option with higher net benefh3 
There are several problems with this 
approach: 
(a) The concept of the public interest 
may be employed to subordinate 
the interests of people to some al- 
leged larger good, such as the inter- 
ests of the state, or to subordinate 
people's own notions of their inter- 
ests to some attributed idealnotion. 
@)Even when the public interest is 
conceived as the aggregate of the 
interests of the people as individu- 
als, it is prone to being subverted by 
the actual practice of development. 
(c) Most crucial for this discussion is 
that the idea of the public interest 
neglects distributive considera- 
tions. 
(a) The notion of the public interest 
lends itself to very different interpreta- 
tions. Some conceptions subordinate 
the interests of people to some larger 
good. Instead of consisting of the ag- 
gregate of interests of the population, 
the public interest may be deemed to 
be the well-being of some overarching 
entity. For example, the unity and se- 
curity of the state may be treated as the 
most basic aim. Thus, in Indonesia and 
Bangladesh tribal peoples in frontier 
areas (e.g., Western New Guinea and 
the Chittagong Hill Tracts, respec- 
tively) have been viewed with suspi- 
cion and development has been 
brought to these areas partly as a way 
of settling loyal populations from the 
national heartland there. This led to 
extensive suffering as well as conflict. 
Especially as customary land occu- 
pancy often lacked legal backing, 
conflicts over land led to violent con- 
frontation and large-scale displace- 
ment due to development-induced 
conflict, with subsequent large-scale 
deaths and refugee flows (Penz 1993). 
Even if the public interest consists of 
the interests of people, it may be con- 
ceived without reference to their own 
notion of what is in their best interest. 
The public interest may be regarded as 
the "development" of people in a par- 
ticular direction, such as becoming 
"civilized". Thus, even post-colonial 
states have pursued the development 
of marginal groups out of their "back- 
wardness" as something desirable in 
itself (Bodley 1990, ch. 8). Such moral 
paternalism smacks of old-style colo- 
nialism and is objectionable in that it 
denies moral agency to such marginal 
groups. 
(b) Even when the public interest is 
clearly recognized as consisting of the 
interests of people, much development 
violates it in practice. The politics of 
development are crucial here. Devel- 
opment is often little more than a strug- 
gle between various sections of the 
national elite over economic opportu- 
nities. In some cases there is not so 
much an extractive struggle as a sys- 
tematically organized regime of ex- 
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ploitation; thus Philip Howard re- 
ferred in his article to a kleptocratic 
regime (rule by thieves) in Haiti under 
the Duvaliers. In either case, what is 
involved is the self-interested use of 
power. A dam, an irrigation project or 
a tree plantation may not serve the 
public interest at all, regardless of how 
the public interest may be conceptual- 
ized, but merely sectional interests. Or 
it is chosen because it contributes to 
state revenues rather than in accord- 
ance with any reasonably comprehen- 
sive conception of the public interest. 
Even if there is a commitment to a pub- 
lic interest approach, development 
politics mean that certain interests 
have greater political recognition than 
others. Forest-dwellers and other mar- 
ginal groups are likely to be rather in- 
visible politically and to have their 
interests ignored in any public-inter- 
est assessment. Moreover, even in a 
systematic cost-benefit analysis, some 
things are difficult to quantify, and 
such difficulties are liable to lead to 
their neglect. Anything not somehow 
obtained, with reasonable ease, from 
market prices, which the theory takes 
to reflect individual valuations, in- 
volves such difficulties. For that rea- 
son, social, cultural and environmental 
losses are prone to neglect. In general, 
to claim that all development serves 
the public interest would be a heroic 
assumption, to say the least. 
(c) Most striking is the neglect of dis- 
tributive considerations in a pure pub- 
lic-interest perspective. It is only 
overall net benefits that determine the 
public interest, not how these are dis- 
tributed. It is thus possible to approve 
of a project in the name of the public 
interest, even though many people are 
harmed, as long as this harm is out- 
weighed by the gains to the country. 
Yet it stands in violation of any reason- 
able notion of social justice. One posi- 
tion is that all those affected should not 
only have all their losses assessed, as 
part of a public-interest calculation of 
aggregate net benefits, but should be 
compensated for them, so that they are 
not harmed by the development ac- 
tion. The entitlement to compensation 
and, more fundamentally, the entitle- 
ment .to consent to development im- 
pacts, including displacement, and to 
refuse such consent is the focus of the 
next perspective. 
Freedom, Property, and Self- 
Determination 
According to the libertarian perspec- 
tive, what makes displacement objec- 
tionable is the violation of freedom that 
is involved. Freedom and the right to 
property without interference that 
goes with it are the central values of 
this perspective. The legitimate basis 
of change is exchange, so that the only 
moral way that a dam can be built for a 
reservoir in a populated valley is to 
have the valley inhabitants accept of- 
fers of remuneration or other forms of 
compensation (e.g., land or employ- 
ment elsewhere). No one can be forced 
out without violating the central moral 
principle of liberty. 
Although libertarianism articulates 
the principle of liberty strictly in refer- 
ence to individuals, a communal or 
"communitarian" version of it is possi- 
ble as well. In this case, it is communi- 
ties that have the fundamental right to 
be self-determining and to be free from 
coercion from the outside. While 
within communities public-interest 
actions may be taken, the public-inter- 
est morality does not apply to relations 
with other communities, the country 
or the world as a whole. (Part of the 
rationale for this position may be that 
only communities are sources of val- 
ues and thus cannot be subordinated 
to any supervening value system.) 
Whether in relation to individuals 
or to communities, particular viola- 
tions of self-determination canbe justi- 
fied only if it is to prevent other, more 
serious violations, such as by an invad- 
ing outside force. In general, it means 
that displacement as forced migration 
is immoral; only negotiated voluntary 
migration is justifiable. 
This position, especially in its com- 
munal form, has much to be said for it. 
In practical terms, it means that devel- 
opment projects have to be negotiated 
with the affected communities. In fact, 
development becomes much more 
community-governed under this self- 
determination perspective. The L.tm 1 
requires a fundamental reorientation 
from the current top-down and busi- 
ness-privileging approach to develop- 
ment. 
Nevertheless, this position is prob- 
lematic. Persuasive critiques come 
both from the public-interest perspec- 
tive and from the equal-sharing per- 
spective that we still have to consider. 
From the public-interest perspective, 
the first point to be made is that the 
conception of self-determination or 
liberty employed is a particular and 
very limited one. Specifically, it is a 
negative conception in that it is con- 
cerned with freedom from interference 
by others, rather than the freedom and 
capacity to choose and pursue certain 
options. The latter is a positive concep- 
tion of self-determination or liberty. 
This raises public-interest considera- 
tions in that the lack of development 
can be seen to constitute a lack of posi- 
tive self-determination. Individuals 
and communities cannot do certain 
things because of their poverty, limited 
resources or restricted technologies or 
skills. Thus, building dams to irrigate 
fields and provide electricity to vil- 
lages and rural industries may en- 
hance self-determination in improving 
the range of options available to peo- 
ple and communities. In that case, the 
negative self-determination not to be 
displaced may stand in tension with 
the positive self-determination of ex- 
panding the range of activities that 
become possible. This then becomes a 
similar trade-off as that involved in 
cost-benefit analysis. 
A second criticism of the self-deter- 
mination perspective that comes from 
the public-interest perspective is a 
very practical one. Individuals (and 
even communities) may refuse to ac- 
cept even a very generous offer to 
move, not because it would not make 
them better off than before, but simply 
because, by holding out for extrava- 
gant compensation, they can enrich 
themselves at the expense of the 
project funders, which may be taxpay- 
ers. This presumably is a major reason 
for the power of eminent domain that 
states tend to retain for themselves. To 
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be fair, such coercive authority needs 
to be coupled with fair compensation, 
but the compensation may need to be 
determined by an independent adju- 
dicator rather than the person or fam- 
ily, because of this opportunity for 
exploitationof public-interest projects. 
From an equal-sharing perspective, 
the problem is that the very strong pro- 
tection that libertarianism and analo- 
gous communitarianism accord to 
individuals and communities, respec- 
tively, also serves the privileged. With 
such protection, land redistribution 
from the big landowners to land ten- 
ants or labourers would not be possi- 
ble.4 More specifically regarding 
displacement, self-determination as 
such has nothing to say about how the 
benefits from development projects 
should be shared. One plausible posi- 
tion is to say that those evicted should 
not only be fully compensated, but that 
they should receive a generous share 
of the development benefits of the 
project for which they had to make 
way. But such considerations of dis- 
tributive justice lead us into the next 
perspective. 
Inequalities aad Justice 
An equal-sharing perspective broad- 
ens the question from simply the treat- 
ment of those displaced or otherwise 
harmed to the overall effects, in a man- 
ner similar to that of the public-interest 
perspective. However, instead of fo- 
cusing on the total of net benefits, the 
focus is on the distribution of costs and 
benefits. In fad, it broadens it even fur- 
ther because the preexisting inequali- 
ties are brought into the picture. 
An equal-sharing orientation can 
have different sources in ethical theo- 
ries. One is that equal sharing is the 
fundamental moral default option. 
Since everyone is entitled to equal con- 
sideration, the burden of proof falls on 
those who want to argue for a distribu- 
tive solution other than equality. Two 
arguments that are widely offered are 
those of incentives and those of prop- 
erty rights. The incentives argument is 
a kind of public-interest argument in 
that individuals are tobe rewarded for 
contributing to the public interest. But 
it raises questions of what constitutes 
the public interest as well as distribu- 
tive justice within this public interest. 
In other words, distributive justice en- 
ters into the justification of incentives. 
One kind of incentive argument 
(which comes from John Rawls's 
[I9711 contractarianism) is that incen- 
tives should be structured so as to im- 
prove the living conditions of the most 
disadvantaged. Inequalities in that 
case are justified only by benefiting the 
poor, e.g. by offering health workers 
higher rewards for locating in rural 
communities or by rewarding engi- 
neers that develop low-technology 
innovations. It is a justification of in- 
equalities, but a very constrained one. 
In general, it works in the direction of 
reducing inequalities, including by 
providing incentives to those assisting 
the poor to improve their conditions. 
The other argument against equal- 
ity is that of the priority of property 
rights. While the existence of property 
rights makes life predictable in an irn- 
portant way, creates a sphere of self- 
determination and also constitutes an 
incentive to productivity, they cannot 
be treated as morally absolute. Much 
property has been inherited, raising 
questions of moral entitlement to in- 
heritance as well as questions about 
the legitimate holding of the property 
by ancestors. In fact, the pervasiveness 
of injustice in the historical acquisition 
and transfer of property (with little 
land, for example, being free from~on- 
quest, force and fraud at some point in 
the historicalchain of transfers) makes 
property rights at most a morally con- 
tingent right. To the extent that inher- 
ited inequalities undermine equality of 
opportunity, their moral basis is very 
much in doubt. I 
If ethical development is to serve not 
only the public interest, but also dis- 
tributive justice in the form of equality 
of opportunity (in more than a superfi- 
cial sense), then development-induced 
displacement must be considered in a 
broader context. If development initia- 
tives serve to reduce inequalities, for 
example by providing electricity and 
irrigation to the poor and inundating 
the plantations and mansions of the 
rich, then displacement may not be 
unjust in the same way as it is when it 
displaces those who are already disad- 
vantaged. There may be an important 
question of fairness among the rich 
(those affected and those not), i.e. 
"horizontal" as opposed to "vertical" 
equity, but, as long as this canbe sorted 
out by appropriate transfers among 
the rich, distributive justice is served 
rather than violated. Displacement 
should stillbe minimized as a matter of 
the public interest or to minimize coer- 
cion or the required rectification of 
horizontal inequities, but it should not 
stop development that makes the dis- 
tribution more just. 
It becomes trickier when the benefi- 
ciaries are one group of disadvan- 
taged, e.g. peasants, and the displaced 
are another group of disadvantaged, 
e.g. forest-dwellers. In that case, hori- 
zontal equity among the disadvan- 
taged becomes crucial. It would 
certainly be unjust to benefit the peas- 
ants because they are part of main- 
stream society, while uprooting 
indigenous forest-dwellers who prac- 
tice a tribal way of life. Not only does 
distributive justice require that anyone 
displaced is fully compensated, but 
that those displaced receive a fair share 
of the benefits of the development. 
This is an important point. Develop- 
ment projects that fully compensate 
those dislocated or otherwise harmed 
may still violate distributive justice if 
the benefits are unfairly distributed. It 
is true that particular development 
projects are designed to improve the 
conditions of particular groups so that 
it may be impossible for a particular 
project to meet this criterion; but the 
requirement of the just distribution of 
benefits can be applied to the overall 
pattern of development. 
Indirect Displacement and Just 
Development 
The discussion so far is most applica- 
ble to direct displacement resulting 
from development. It is then reason- 
ably clear who the displacement vic- 
tims are and who ought to receive 
compensation and share in the devel- 
opment benefits. In the case of indirect 
40 RqFgc, Vol. 16, No. 3 (August 1997) 
I 
displacement, there is no such clarity. 
When a poor peasant family sells its 
little plot of land and switches to mak- 
ing a living with insecure day-labour 
employment, it is not necessarily clear 
whether this was a result of deliberate 
development initiatives or a result of 
processes of economic change beyond 
the control of development authori- 
ties. In such cases, however, it is not 
inappropriate to treat development in 
general as a national project, which has 
its victims, and these victims are then 
entitled to compensation and a share 
in the development benefits. But com- 
pensation is difficult to determine in 
such cases and a share in the develop- 
ment benefits is a loose notion at best. 
What this point, and the preceding one 
concerning the difficulty of fairly dis- 
tributing the benefits of particular 
projects, mean is that those who are left 
or made poor in the development proc- 
ess and thus prone to displacement are 
entitled to assistance. A bottom-up 
approach to development mentioned 
in the introductory overview to this 
edition of Refuge would in fact do this. 
Conclusion 
The self-determination perspective is 
important in requiring consultation 
with communities in the design of de- 
velopment projects that will impact 
them sigruficantly. It requires that the 
communities' own conception of their 
interests and their management of 
their environment be respected. More 
specifically, it requires that forced mi- 
gration be avoided and replaced by 
negotiated resettlement terms, wher- 
ever the need for population move- 
ments cannot be avoided. But 
self-determination cannot be asserted 
in such unqualified terms that devel- 
opment which serves both the public 
interest and distributive justice is 
blocked. There are conditions under 
which development-induced dis- 
placement can be justified. But these 
are strong conditions, including that 
coercive displacement is as much as 
possible avoided by negotiated reset- 
tlement, is quantitatively minimized, 
and is fully compensated. Full com- 
pensation means recognizing the full 
range of losses that those dislocated' 
experience. Moreover, the justifying 
conditions include that the develop- 
ment benefits contribute to reducing 
poverty and inequality. These condi- 
tions have been massively violated not 
only in the particular displacement 
processes which have been described 
in this edition of Refuge, but typically 
also in the globally ubiquitous pattern 
of development-induced displace- 
ment. 
Notes 
1. This field is represented by the Intema- 
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Institute for Philosophy and Public 
Policy, 3111 Van Munching Bldg., 
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2. This classification is a slight elaboration 
of the very basic framework I employed 
in Penz 1997, which confined itself to the 
no-harm and equal-sharing perspectives 
in the treatment of international environ- 
mental justice. The one employed in this 
article roughly corresponds to three of 
the perspectives on social justice in 
standard classifications in political phi- 
losophy, namely utilitarianism, libertari- 
anism and egalitarianism. Another 
perspective, that of contractarianism, is 
an amalgam of these three. Commu- 
nitarianism can take a variety of forms; I 
will discuss one form in connection with 
libertarianism. For such classifications 
and explanations of the perspectives con- 
tained in them see e.g. Smith 1984, chap- 
ters 4 and 5; and Sterba 1992. For a more 
elaborate classification specifically of 
perspectives in development ethics, see 
Penz 1991. 
3. There is a problem in cost-benefit analy- 
sis in that valuations by individuals are 
determined by their wealth levels, but 
this is more of a distributive issue of con- 
cern to the equal-sharing perspective 
introduced below than to the public-in- 
terest persphive. For a fuller discussion 
of cost-benefit analysis from an ethical 
perspective, see e.g. Wenz 1988, chapter 
on cost-benefit analysis. 
4. In Penz 1992, I argue for an equal-sharing 
perspective even with respect to the land 
of indigenous peoples, but introduce im- 
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New Issues in Migration 
Edited by Howard Adelman 
ISBN 1-55014-238-0.1995. 
287 pp., indexed. $22.95 
Freedom of movement: If the mem- 
bers of a state are forced to flee, the 
legitimacy of that government is ques- 
tionable. On the other hand, if mem- 
bers cannot or must leave, again the 
government is not democratically 
legitimate. 
Immigration control: While limiting 
access and determining who may or 
may not become members of a sover- 
eign state remains a legitimate pre- 
rogative of the state, the criteria, rules 
and processes for doing so must be 
compatible with its character as a 
democratic state. 
Legitimate andlllegitimate Discrimi- 
nation: New Issues in Migration, ed- 
ited by Professor Howard Adelman, 
deals with the question of legitimacy 
with cases studies from the Develop 
ing World, Europe, Australia, the 
United States, and Canada. 
CONTRIBUTORS: 
Rainer Baubock, Howard Adelman, 
Gaim Kibreab, A. Essuman-Johnson, 
Grant M. Farr, Lawrence Lam, Oscar 
Schiappa-Pietra, Tomas Hammar, 
FredCric Tiberghien (in French), Lois 
Foster, and Arthur C. Helton. 
Available porn: 
Centre for Refugee Studies 
Tel.: (416) 736-5843 
Fax: (416) 736-5837 
Email: refuge@yorku.ca 
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IIBoat People" in 
Montreal, 1980-1990 
By Lawrence Lam 
 Toronto: York Lanes Press 
ISBN 1-55014-296-8 
200 pages, indexed; $18.95 
The saga of the "boat people" is a 
dramatic story, a story of one of the 
largest refugee movements in 
recent years. Canada played a sig-
nificant role in the resettlement of 
these refugees in bringing them to 
Canada where they could start 
anew. From Being Uprooted to Sur-
viving by Professor Lam, is based 
on ethnographic data of a sample of 
Vietnamese-Chinese accepted for 
resettlement in Montreal in 1979 
and 1980, who were interviewed 
again in 1984--85 and in 1990-91, 
this book providesalongitudinal 
account of their experience of 
resettlement in Canada. This 
experience has been marked by 
successive stages of their struggle 
to overcome structural barriers and 
to negotiate, a meaningful niche in 
Canada. 
Contents: Preface, The Boat Peopie 
Phenomenon, ReSettlementIssues 
and Perspectives, The Vietnamese-
Chinese Refugees,Exo 
dus and Transition, Resettlement 
Process-The First Three Years, 
Resettlement Beyond the First 
Three Years, Conclusion. 
Available from: 
Centre for Refugee Studies 
York University 
Suite 333, York Lanes 4700 
Keele;Street 
North Yark ON M3J IP3 
Back Issues of Refuge 
The following is a list of general and thematic issues of 
Refuge-Canada's periodical on refugees. 
1. Environmental Refugees, Vol. 12, No.1, June 1992. 
2. Discussion ofImmigration Bill C-86, Vol. 12, No.2, July/(Aug.) 1992. 
3. General Issue/Refugee Sponsorship, Vol. 12, No.3, Sept. 1992. 
4. Eastern European Refugees, Vol. 12, No.4, Oct. 1992. 
5. The Tragedy of Somalia, Vol. 12, No.5, Nov.lDec. 1992. 
6. The Review of Rejected Refugee Claims in Canada, Vol. 12, No.6, Jan. 1993. 7. 
Russia and Central Eurasia, Vol. 12, No.7, February 1993. 
8. Africa Issue: Repatriation, Vol. 12, No.8, March 1993. 
9. General Issue/Globalization, Vol. 13, No.1, Apri11993. 
10. Russia and Central Eurasia, Vol. 13, No.2, May 1993. 
11. Special Issue on Sri Lanka, Vol. 13, No.3, June 1993. 
12. Gender Issues and Refugee Law, Vol. 13, No.4, July/Aug. 1993. 
13. Southeast Asian Refugees, Vol. 13, No.5, Sept. 1993. 
14. Mozambican Refugees, Vol. 13, No.6, October 1993. 
15. Russia and Central Eurasia, Vol. 13, No.7, Nov.lDec. 1993. 
16. General Issue/Sudan, Vol. 13, No.8, January 1994. 
17. Integration of Refugees-The Canadian Experience, Vol. 13, No.9, Feb. 1994. 18. 
Refugees and Peace in Central America, Vol. 13, No. 10, March 1994. 
19. Horn of Africa, Vol. 14, No.1, April 1994. 
20. The Russian Federation, Vol. 14, No.2, May 1994. 
21. The Former Yugoslavia, Vol. 14, No.3, June/July 1994. 
22. General Issue/IRB and Rebuilding Trustrramil Immigrants in Canada, Vol. 
14, No.4, Aug.lSept. 1994. 
23. Rwandan Crisis, Vol. 14, No.5, October 1994. 
24. Refugee Resettlement in Israel, Vol. 14, No.6, Nov. 1994. 
25. Refugee Women-Part 1: Issues, Vol. 14, No.7, Dec. 1994. 
26. Refugee Women-Part 2: Case Studies, Vol. 14, No.8, Jan. 1995. 
27. The Safe Third Country Concept, Vol. 14, No.9, February 1995. 
28. Special Issue on Chechnya, Vol. 14, No. 10, March 1995. 
29. Reformulation ofInternational Refugee Law, Vol. 15, No.1, 1996. 
30. Environment, Development and Refugees, Vol. 15, No.2, 1996. 
31. International Intervention in Refugee Crises, Vol. 15, No.3, 1996. 
32. Early Warning on Humanitarian Crises, Vol. 15, No.4, 1996. 
33. Child Refugees, Vol. 15, No.5, 1996. 
34. Global Settlement Services, Vol. 15, No.6, 1997. 
35. Early Warning and Early Response, Vol. 16, No.1, May 1997. 
36. Uprooting and Consequences, Vol. 16, No.2, June 1997. 
Single copy: Vol 12, 13 &14-$6.50; Vol 15-$10. 10 percent discount on 3-9 issues 
(copies); 20 percent discount on 10 issues (copies) or more. Special discounts are 
available for students and exclusively volunteer-run NGOs. P. O. accepted. Please 
send your orders to: 
Centre for Refugee Studies, York University 
Suite 333, York Lanes, 4700 Keele Street 
North York, Ontario, J IP3, Canada  M3
Fax: (416) 736-5837 · Email: refuge@yorku.ca 
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